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ABSTRACT 
The two systems theory developed by Apperly and Butterfill (2009; Butterfill & Apperly, 
2013) is an influential approach to explaining the success of infants and young children on 
implicit false belief tasks. There is extensive empirical and theoretical work examining many 
aspects of this theory, but little attention has been paid to the way in which it characterizes 
goal attribution. We argue here that this aspect of the theory is inadequate. Butterfill and 
Apperly’s characterization of goal attribution is designed to show how goals could be 
ascribed by infants without representing them as related to other psychological states, and the 
minimal mindreading system is supposed to operate without employing flexible semantic-
executive cognitive processes. But research on infant goal attribution reveals that infants 
exhibit a high degree of situational awareness that is strongly suggestive of flexible semantic-
executive cognitive processing, and infants appear moreover to be sensitive to interrelations 
between goals, preferences and beliefs. Further, close attention to the structure of implicit 
mindreading tasks – for which the theory was specifically designed – indicates that flexible 
goal attribution is required to succeed. We conclude by suggesting two approaches to 
resolving these problems. 
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One of the central challenges for contemporary developmental psychology is to provide a 
satisfactory explanation of the following, seemingly paradoxical, pattern of findings. On the 
one hand, children do not tend to succeed at explicit verbal false belief tasks until about four-
and-a-half years of age (Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Wellman et al., 2001; but see Rubio-
Fernández & Geurts, 2012). On the other hand, however, studies using implicit measures have 
now produced extensive evidence that infants are sensitive to others’ false beliefs by the 
second year of life (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Surian et al., 2007; for reviews, see Apperly, 
2011, chap. 3; Baillargeon et al., 2010), and perhaps as early as the middle of their first year 
(Kovacs et al., 2010; Southgate et al., 2014). 
 The debate about how to account for this conflict has been structured by a contrast 
between rich and lean accounts. Rich accounts (e.g. Baillargeon et al., 2010; Kovacs et al., 
2010; Southgate et al., 2007; Carruthers, 2013) maintain that infants represent others’ beliefs 
by around one year or earlier, and then offer various explanations to account for the lag in 
performance on explicit verbal false belief tasks. In contrast, lean accounts (Perner & 
Ruffman, 2005; Heyes, 2014; Ruffman, 2014) deny that children represent beliefs before 
about four, and interpret infants’ performance on implicit false belief tasks as resulting from 
behavior reading based on statistical learning. In between these two extremes, Apperly and 
Butterfill (2009; Apperly, 2011; Butterfill & Apperly, 2013) have proposed a two-systems 
account of mindreading. They explain the infant data by positing an early-emerging, simple, 
modular representational system that enables infants and young children to track beliefs in 
restricted circumstances, but does not afford the representation of beliefs ‘as such’. The latter 
ability emerges when a second system for belief representation employing working memory 
and generalized, flexible long-term memory is in place. For convenience we’ll refer to these 
two systems as the ‘minimal’ and ‘flexible’ mindreading systems, following Apperly and 
Butterfill’s terminology. 
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 Although Apperly and Butterfill’s theory has received a great deal of attention, one 
crucial element has not yet been examined closely – the way in which the theory accounts for 
goal attribution in minimal mindreading. In what follows we show that there are problems 
with this aspect of the theory. We begin by briefly recapitulating Apperly and Butterfill’s 
theory (‘Minimal mindreading’). We then argue that the account of goal attribution is 
underspecified, and that it will be difficult to remedy this shortcoming, given that the overall 
theory by design eschews the cognitive flexibility that appears to be required to explain 
context-sensitive goal attribution (‘Interpreting principle 1’). Next we summarize a selection 
of key empirical findings which indicate that infant goal attribution indeed shows the kind of 
context-sensitivity that is difficult for Apperly and Butterfill’s theory to explain (Evidence 
against principle 1’). We go on to argue that this kind of flexible, context-sensitive goal 
attribution also plays a role in infant performance on false belief tasks (‘Problems in applying 
principles 2-4’). Finally, we canvass options for revising the theory and suggest that the most 





Butterfill and Apperly (2013) (henceforth B&A) provide a functional specification of the 
early-emerging mindreading system, which was described only briefly in Apperly & Butterfill 
(2009). Their aim is to specify a set of principles and representations that could enable a 
system to track beliefs in simple situations without representing beliefs ‘as such’. Because of 
the simplicity of the principles and representations employed by such a system, it would lack 
the flexibility that B&A associate with adult mindreading. One of the attractions of this 
approach is that it offers the potential to explain infants’ success on implicit false belief tasks 
while simultaneously providing a basis for explaining why success on explicit versions of the 
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false belief task is delayed. The core of B&A’s minimal mindreading system, then, is a set of 
four principles for reasoning about belief-like states of other agents on the basis of their 
behavior, which are as follows. 
 
Principle 1: Bodily movements form units that are directed towards goals. As B&A put it:  
 
‘We stipulate that for an outcome, g, to be the goal of some bodily movements is 
for these bodily movements to occur in order to bring about g; that is, g is the 
function of this collection. Here ‘function’ should be understood teleologically. 
On the simplest teleological construal of function, for an action to have the 
function of bringing about g would be for actions of this type to have brought 
about g in the past and for this action to occur in part because of this fact’ (2013, 
p. 613).  
 
The virtue of this way of representing goals is that it allows them to be inferred from 
actions without appealing to intentions, beliefs, preferences or other psychological states 
(p. 613).  
 
Principle 2: B&A introduce two kinds of representation – fields and encounterings – that 
together serve as a simplified surrogate for visual perception. B&A stipulate that a field is a 
‘set of objects’ (p. 614) in an area specified in relation to the agent. The agent’s field is 
determined by factors such as proximity, lighting, eye direction, opaque barriers, and so on. 
Encountering is a relation between the agent and an object, and it occurs when the object is in 
the agent’s field. The second principle, then, is that the agent must encounter an object before 
she can engage in goal-directed actions aimed at the object (p. 615).  
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Principle 3: This depends on a further type of representation, registration, which serves as a 
partial surrogate for belief. An agent registers an object as being in a particular location either 
when the agent has encountered it in that location and not subsequently encountered it 
anywhere else, or when the agent successfully performs a goal-directed action on the object at 
that location (619). A registration is like a memory of an encountering in that it maintains the 
information gained in an encounter through a period in which the agent isn’t directly 
encountering the object. If the object is moved after an agent has encountered it, the 
registration will not be updated, and will consequently be false. As a result, the agent will not 
succeed in performing a goal-directed action involving the object. In full, then, the third 
principle states that an agent must correctly register an object at a particular location if she is 
to successfully perform a goal-directed action aimed at the object. B&A say that this principle 
can be applied in two directions. An agent who does not correctly register an object will not 
be able to successfully perform actions with goals specifying that object. And if an agent does 
succeed in performing an action with a goal that specifies the object, it can be inferred that 
she has correctly registered its location (p. 617). 
 
Principle 4: In initiating an action with a goal that specifies a particular object, an agent will 
approach the location at which she registers that object (p. 619). B&A claim that with this 
principle an infant can predict that an agent will search at the wrong location in a false belief 
scenario in which an object has been transferred from one location to another during her 
absence (p. 620). 
 
B&A argue that a system implementing these four principles could track beliefs in a limited 
but useful range of circumstances1. An agent making use of such a system is not engaging in 
                                                
1 B&A present their account as a ‘computational theory in Marr’s sense’, and remain neutral 
as to how these principles may be implemented in humans and other agents (p. 613). 
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mere behavior-reading (as envisioned by lean accounts), because the principles of minimal 
mindreading generate behavioral predictions on the basis of representations of mediating 
agent properties and states (field, encountering, registration). Insofar as registration is a form 
of stored information that has correctness conditions which allow for falsity, and is a guide to 
action, it has some of the properties of belief. 
Nevertheless, this falls short of representing beliefs ‘as such,’ according to B&A. 
Apperly & Butterfill (2009) characterize the representation of a belief ‘as such’ as 
representing it as an attitude to ‘a content’ that plays a certain psychological role. They 
describe the content as ‘propositional’, which they define as ‘sentence-like’ (2009, p. 957), 
and as allowing for beliefs with complex contents, such as those involving quantification 
(2009, p. 960). They describe the psychological role of belief as including being caused and 
justified by perception, as interacting with other psychological states (other beliefs, desires, 
emotions, preferences, etc.), and as causing and justifying actions (2009, p. 957). According 
to their account, ‘as such’ or ‘full-blown’ mindreading is performed by a flexible mindreading 
system distinct from the minimal system, with the two systems operating largely in parallel 
(2009, p. 964).  
To understand the structure of B&A’s minimal mindreading system and the reasons 
for postulating two systems, it is important to consider the arguments concerning efficiency 
and flexibility given by Apperly & Butterfill (2009; see also Apperly, 2011). ‘Full-blown’ 
mindreading, with the attributes just described, exhibits a high degree of representational 
power coupled with inferential holism: the mindreader can attribute any belief content that 
she herself is able to entertain, and belief attribution can be based on an unlimited variety and 
amount of information. Apperly & Butterfill (2009) claim that this flexibility is cognitively 
expensive – demanding executive cognitive resources – and that this kind of mindreading is 
hence unsuited to circumstances where processing must be fast and efficient. They include 
both infant mindreading and fluent everyday communication in adults as examples where 
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efficient mindreading is required (2009, p. 959). The minimal mindreading system is 
conceived in such a way as to avoid the features of ‘full-blown’ mindreading that make it 
cognitively expensive, while still achieving some significant representational ability. Thus, 
representational power is sacrificed by allowing only a simple fixed set of representations, 
and inferential holism is eliminated by relying on a simple fixed set of inferential principles. 
The core rationale of the theory, then, is that the two mindreading systems constitute two 
distinct solutions to the competing requirements of efficiency and flexibility. It is this 
rationale that links the Apperly & Butterfill account to other ‘two systems’ theories in 
reasoning, decision-making and social psychology (2009, p. 957; Evans & Stanovich, 2013). 
The limits of the minimal mindreading system serve as the basis for identifying forms 
of empirical evidence that would reveal the existence of the system. Infants should be 
insensitive to the mode of presentation, or the way that the item is represented by the belief 
holder (Apperly & Butterfill 2009, p. 957; B&A, p. 621-625). This will, for instance, result in 
an inability to perform level-2 perspective taking, and stems from the way that minimal 
mindreading ‘makes use of objects and their relations to agents, rather than representations of 
objects, to predict others’ behaviours’ (B&A, p. 622). Apperly & Butterfill identify the 
inferential holism of full-blown mindreading as a primary source of cognitive inefficiency, 
and suggest that infants may be unable to appreciate relations amongst multiple beliefs or 
between beliefs and desires (2009, p. 957). Accordingly, the more elaborated minimal 
mindreading scheme presented by B&A is specifically designed not to represent such 
relations. 
 As we noted in the introduction, B&A’s theory provides a middle ground between 
lean and rich accounts of infants’ precocity on non-verbal false belief tasks. A great deal of 
work has examined various aspects of the theory (see e.g. Scott & Baillargeon, 2009; Low & 
Watts, 2013; Rakoczy et al., 2014; Kovacs, forthcoming; Christensen & Michael, 2015), and 
our aim here is to focus on its account of goal attribution in particular. Explaining infant goal 
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attribution is not the main focus of B&A’s theory, and, more broadly, goal attribution has not 
been a primary concern of research that addresses belief representation and the false-belief 
task. Nevertheless, goal attribution plays an important role in the false belief task, and it is 
also important to ensure that B&A’s theory is consistent with the full range of relevant 
evidence. 
 
Interpreting Principle 1 
 
The first principle is much less clearly specified than the other three. The latter, together with 
their supporting explications, characterize particular forms of representation, conditions in 
which those representations will be invoked, and specific relations among representations. In 
contrast, the first principle only says that goals are represented as outcomes which are 
functionally-teleologically related to actions – it doesn’t describe the specific form of 
representation employed to attribute or reason about goals. Nor is any clear account given of 
the conditions in which goals are attributed and the kinds of information that contribute to 
goal attribution, other than the proscription on information concerning psychological states. 
B&A only say that there is evidence that young children, non-human primates, and corvids 
can track the functions of things (2013, p. 614). But a positive theory of goal attribution must 
specify how infants identify particular outcomes as the goals of actions. 
One way to view the first principle is as primarily serving a ground-clearing role. It is 
not intended as a positive account of goal attribution, but rather aims to suggest how infants 
could represent goals without representing them as dependent on intentions and other 
psychological states such as preferences and beliefs. The problem with this, however, is that 
principles 2-4 are dependent on principle 1, since principles 2-4 can only be applied in 
particular cases in combination with specific goal attributions. In other words, B&A’s theory 
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of minimal mindreading is incomplete without a positive account of goal attribution, and 
principle 1 fails to provide such an account.  
A deeper problem is that it will be difficult to develop a theoretically and empirically 
adequate account of goal attribution within the constraints of the approach that B&A have 
adopted. This is because one and the same action may have many distinct outcomes, and it is 
often necessary to draw flexibly upon contextual information, including information about 
specific agents’ preferences and other psychological states, in order to identify which of the 
possible outcomes of an action is the agent’s goal. Thus, reaching for the tap when the water 
is off is likely to aim at turning it on, while reaching for the tap while the water is running is 
likely to aim at turning it off, or perhaps at adjusting the flow. Reaching for the toy car is 
perhaps most likely aimed at playing with it, unless it is a tidying-up context, while reaching 
towards the dog may aim at patting. The challenge, then, is to explain how B&A’s minimal 
mindreading system could take context into account in attributing goals. 
 In framing this challenge it will be will be useful to distinguish between procedural 
and knowledge-based goal attribution. This contrast follows the broad distinction between the 
procedural and declarative or explicit memory systems (Cohen & Squire, 1980; Squire 2004; 
Poldrack & Packard, 2003).2 Knowledge-based goal attribution involves semantic knowledge 
and episodic memory, which are integrated and processed in working memory. We will refer 
to the explicit-executive system as the combined explicit long-term and working memory 
system that actively selects and processes explicit knowledge. Procedural goal attribution, in 
contrast, relies on procedural memory, including statistical action-effect relations, and 
                                                
2 We prefer the term ‘explicit’ to ‘declarative’, in part because it is less awkward when 
discussing preverbal infants. Research using deferred imitation has found explicit memory in 
infants as young as 6 months of age (Barr et al., 1996). In this approach the infant is shown 
novel actions that are demonstrated with props, and after a delay the infant is allowed to 
manipulate the props. The test is whether the infant re-enacts the action that has been shown. 
Memories evoked using this method exhibit a number of the characteristic attributes of 
explicit memory, including learning based on a single experience, accessibility to language (in 
older children), flexibility, and impaired ability when the task is given to adults with amnesia 
(Carver & Bauer, 2001; Bauer, 2006). 
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possibly specialized implicit action perception systems such as a ‘motor resonance’ system 
(e.g., Paulus et al., 2011). Since B&A’s minimal mindreading system is designed to avoid 
flexible processing mediated by executive control, we take it that an elaborated account of 
goal attribution consistent with the general constraints of the theory will be largely restricted 
to procedural mechanisms, i.e. that it will be severely limited in the extent to which it can 
incorporate functional type information, since functional categories like ‘scissors’, ‘crayon’, 
and ‘glue’ are knowledge-based. 
 This is not to deny that semantic processing can occur outside of awareness and 
involuntarily. Indeed, implicit semantic priming (Neely, 1977) and implicit association tasks 
(Greenwald et al., 1998) provide clear evidence that it can3. It must be emphasized, however, 
that priming and implicit association tasks facilitate semantic representations in a non-task-
specific way. Thus, they will inherently tend to facilitate many semantically and associatively 
related representations that are not relevant to the task. In contrast, the explicit-executive 
system can selectively activate and process task-relevant semantic information, which in the 
case of goal attribution would involve semantic information relevant to identifying the goal. 
The challenge, then, is to specify how a system like B&A’s minimal mindreading system, 
which is designed to be largely restricted to procedural mechanisms, could achieve the 
requisite selectivity to ensure the activation of representations that are relevant to goal 
attribution in a given context. 
 In considering the extent to which B&A’s minimal mindreading system can use 
contextual information for goal attribution it will also be useful to distinguish between 
stereotypical context information and information concerning the particularities of a given 
situation. In expertise research, the representation of the latter is referred to as situation 
awareness (Endsley, 1995). Situation awareness involves the construction of a situation 
model that captures key causal elements and relations present in the situation. Because it is 
                                                
3 We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this point. 
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based on a flexible capacity for causal representation, model construction permits effective 
interpretation of and response to new situations. We’ll call goal attribution based on 
integrated situation awareness situational goal attribution. For example, if Jenny’s pencil 
breaks while she is writing, an onlooker with a high degree of situation awareness might 
predict that she will reach for a pen, since the situationally relevant causal properties of a pen 
are similar to those of a pencil. Note that situational goal attribution incorporates explicit 
knowledge and is a form of knowledge-based goal attribution. Given the proscriptions against 
flexibility and executive control that A&B impose, their account appears to be limited in the 
extent to which it can incorporate situational goal ascription 
In this respect it is illuminating to consider whether B&A might appeal to Csibra and 
Gergely’s theory of teleological action interpretation (Csibra, 2003; Gergely & Csibra, 2003). 
To a first approximation this seems like an appealing strategy since, in its base form, Csibra 
and Gergely’s theory doesn’t postulate the representation of mental states, but nevertheless 
incorporates powerful mechanisms for relating actions to goals and situations. Briefly, in this 
account teleological action interpretation interrelates behavior, outcome and the situation by 
means of a principle of efficiency, or ‘rational action’. That is, an action is assumed to aim at 
an outcome in the most efficient way available, given the constraints of the situation. For 
instance, if a small ball is seen to approach a large ball via a path that seems to leap over an 
obstacle, it will be inferred that the goal of the small ball is to contact the large ball, and that 
the trajectory is an efficient means to this end, given the presence of the obstacle. If presented 
with a subsequent scenario in which the obstacle is not present, infants will be more surprised 
if the small ball follows the same ‘leaping’ trajectory (now over free space) than they will be 
by a direct path to the large ball. In its simplest form, teleological interpretation is non-
mentalistic, according to Csibra and Gergely, in the sense that there is no reference to 
intentions, desires or beliefs but, rather, only to behavior, outcomes and situational 
constraints.  
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But although this aspect of the account is compatible with B&A’s minimal 
mindreading system, other aspects of Csibra and Gergely’s account are not consistent with 
B&A’s theory. Specifically, Csibra and Gergely’s account exhibits the kind of inferential 
holism that B&A’s minimal mindreading system is designed to avoid. There is no in-principle 
restriction on the kinds of representations or inferences that can be involved in relating a 
behavior with the outcome and the situation, and it is claimed that novel and unusual actions 
and situations can be interpreted. For instance, Gergely et al. (2002) report evidence that 14-
month-old infants were able to evaluate the efficiency of an action in which an adult turned on 
a light with her forehead, distinguishing a situation in which the adult’s hands were restrained 
from a situation in which they were free. It is plausible that the interpretation of novel 
situations like this will depend on controlled semantic processing and situational goal 
attribution. 
 B&A’s characterization of the minimal mindreading system also implies that 
information about the agent could only play a very limited role in goal attribution. The first 
principle, as it stands, relates a goal to an action, not to the agent performing the action. Yet 
the link between a taking-toys-out-of-the-toy-box-and-putting-them-on-the-floor activity and 
a subsequent playing-with-the-toys activity is an agent who wants to play, and who has 
preferences for some toys over other ones, has perceptual access to the toys, etc. By 
appreciating this – i.e. by identifying an agent as the organizational nexus for action – it is 
possible to draw on what one knows about that specific agent’s prior activities, preferences 
and other psychological states in constraining goal attribution. We will refer to the association 
of a goal with an agent as agentic linking. In principle, B&A’s account of the minimal 
mindreading system could be extended to explicitly include agentic linking, but it is difficult 
to see how such a system could make significant use of agentic linking in goal attribution. 
This is because it is specifically designed not to accumulate information about the activities, 
preferences and beliefs of specific agents to be used flexibly for goal attribution, since doing 
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so would require the resources of explicit memory and executive-mediated situation 
awareness. 
 In sum, B&A’s minimal mindreading system is designed to avoid the representation of 
psychological states and the employment of flexible cognitive processes that can take into 
account an open-ended range of information. B&A accordingly define goals as outcomes 
towards which behaviors are functionally-teleologically related. The prima facie problem for 
this is that the same action can be performed to achieve varied goals, suggesting that it will be 
difficult or impossible to predictively identify goals on the basis of action type alone. 
Information about context can help to disambiguate goals, and B&A’s theory can appeal to 
stereotypical context differentiation. However, it cannot appeal to mechanisms that integrate 
contextual information flexibly, so it will be unable to incorporate situational goal attribution 
or other forms of knowledge-based goal attribution. And it would therefore be severely 
restricted in its ability to make use of agentic linking even if it were revised to allow for the 
representation of preferences. 
 This reasoning gives us prima facie grounds to doubt that B&A will be able to 
construct an adequate account of goal attribution within the constraints they have adopted for 
the minimal mindreading system. If we recognize that infants possess explicit memory 
(Carver & Bauer, 2001; Bauer, 2006), and if we accept that action-goal relations often do 
show strong context-sensitivity, and if we further assume that the ability to interpret the 
actions of others is extremely important for infants, then it is reasonable to expect that they 
will have at least some capacity for flexible goal attribution mediated by the explicit-
executive system. In the next section, we will review evidence indicating that this is indeed 
the case. 
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Evidence Against Principle 1 
 
There is a large body of research on infant goal attribution providing strong evidence that 
infants relate goals to specific agents and take into account complex, idiosyncratic features of 
situations. In one highly influential study, for example, Woodward (1998) found that infants 
take prior actions into account when attributing goals. In this study, 5-month-old infants were 
first habituated to an event in which an agent reached for toy A in an array of two toys, A and 
B. In the test trial, the locations of the toys were reversed and the agent reached either for toy 
A at the new location, or for toy B at the original location. The main finding was that the 
infants looked longer when the agent reached for toy B, suggesting that they interpreted the 
goal of the reaching in the habituation phase as being the object rather than the location, and 
expected in the test trial that the reaching would have the same goal. In a more recent study 
based on the same paradigm, Cannon and Woodward (2012) found convergent evidence by 
measuring 11 month-old infants’ predictive eye movements rather than looking time. 
 The fact that the infants in these studies expected the reach towards toy B indicates 
that in attributing action goals they were taking into account the previous behavior of the 
agent. A deflationary interpretation of this finding is that the infants simply formed an 
association between the agent and toy A which was broken in the test trial. An alternative 
interpretation is that the infants saw the selection of toy A in the habituation phase as a 
contrastive choice that revealed a preference for toy A in comparison with toy B, and they 
expected this preference to guide the agent’s actions in the test situation.  
 A study by Luo and Baillargeon (2005) supports the latter interpretation. 5-month-old 
infants were habituated to a self-propelled box approaching a target (a cone). In a non-
contrastive condition there was only one possible target during the familiarization phase, 
while in a contrastive choice condition there was a second possible target (a cylinder), which 
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the box never approached. In the test phase a cone and cylinder were present. If the infants 
experienced the contrastive choice condition during the familiarization phase they expected 
the box to again approach the cone. But if they experienced the non-contrastive condition they 
had no expectation concerning which object the box would approach. This undermines a 
simple association interpretation because there is as much reason to expect an association 
between the agent and the cone to form in the non-contrastive condition as in the contrastive 
choice condition. 
 A later study examined whether 12.5-month-old infants are sensitive to the agent’s 
perceptual access when there is apparent contrastive choice. Luo and Baillargeon (2007) 
employed a habituation phase that included a visible object condition in which the agent could 
see that there was a second object. In a hidden object condition a second object was present 
but the agent couldn’t see it. In the test trial the agent selected one of the two objects. If the 
infants had experienced the visible object condition they expected the agent to maintain the 
same goal, whereas if they had experienced the hidden object condition they had no 
expectation. In a more recent study with 6-month-olds, Kim & Song (2015) reported 
convergent evidence using predictive eye movements rather than looking time as a measure. 
Luo (2011) showed further that infants not only take into account perceptual access in 
detecting contrastive choice, they can also take into account the beliefs of the agent. She 
found that 10-month-olds did not attribute a preference for an object to an agent if the agent 
had been interacting with the object but believed (truly or falsely) that no other objects were 
present.  
Other studies have examined infant sensitivity to higher order goal structure, in 
particular whether they interpret an initial action in a multi-action sequence as being aimed at 
the overall outcome. Sommerville & Woodward (2005) employed a task that involved pulling 
a piece of cloth to obtain a toy sitting on it that is out of reach. The agent faced two pieces of 
cloth of different colors, and on each cloth there was a toy out of reach, different from the toy 
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on the other cloth. In habituation trials the agent pulled one of the cloths towards her and 
grasped the toy. The question at issue was whether infants interpreted the action of pulling the 
cloth as having the goal of obtaining the particular object on it. In test trials the location of the 
toys was reversed. The agent either grasped the same cloth as previously, or grasped the other 
cloth, which had the same toy as was previously attained. In neither case was a toy touched. 
Twelve-month-old infants were more surprised when the agent grasped the same cloth, 
indicating that they interpreted the toy as being the target of the action. This result also 
suggests that infants represent causal relations by which actions achieve outcomes, including 
mediative relations in which an agent acts on an object without physically touching it. In a 
variation of the experiment the causal relation was broken: the toys were beside rather than on 
the cloths. In habituation trials the agent first pulled the cloth then reached for the toy beside 
the cloth. In test trials toys were swapped and the agent either reached for the same or the 
other cloth. Infants in this condition did not respond with longer looking times when the same 
cloth (with the new toy adjacent) was grasped. 
 A study with 13.5-month-olds by Song, Baillargeon & Fisher (2005) also indicates an 
understanding of hierarchical action relations based on causal understanding. They first 
presented infants with three familiarization trials in which an agent grasped an object on the 
floor of an apparatus and slid it back and forth. Various objects (a toy fish, a box, and a shoe) 
were used. The infants were then shown a display with two identical toy trucks resting next to 
each other on the apparatus floor. The truck on the right was in a short frame, making it 
impossible for the agent to slide the truck back and forth. The truck on the left was in a longer 
frame that had enough space for the agent to slide the truck back and forth. Finally, on the test 
trial, the agent grasped one of the trucks – either the one in the long frame or the one in the 
short frame. The main result was that infants who saw the agent grasp the truck in the short 
frame looked reliably longer. This indicates that they attributed to the agent the goal of sliding 
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an object back and forth, and understood that this goal could only be achieved with the truck 
in the long frame. 
These studies suggest strongly that infants in the second year of life attribute goals to 
agents rather than to actions, and do so in a manner that is constrained by the preferences and 
epistemic states of specific agents (i.e. making use of agentic linking). However, they don’t 
rule out the possibility that infants take contrastive choice to reveal the value of the object 
rather than a preference of the agent. Adults often interpret contrastive choice both as 
revealing a preference of the chooser and as indicating that the preferred object is (or might 
be) valuable. It’s conceivable, however, that infants might assign goals to actions and values 
to objects, but not assign goals and preferences to agents. To eliminate this possibility, Buresh 
and Woodward (2007) employed a different agent in the habituation and test phases of an 
experiment using the contrastive choice design. If goals and preferences are attributed to 
agents, then a contrastive choice by agent A when presented with two objects should not 
influence the infant’s expectations for the subsequent choice of agent B when presented with 
the same two objects. If infants interpret contrastive choice as indicating the value of an 
object, and assume that any agent will select an object thus shown to be valuable, then they 
should expect agent B to select the same object as agent A. Buresh and Woodward found that 
9 and 12 month old infants had no expectations for the choice of agent B, indicating that they 
interpreted contrastive choice as revealing a preference of the specific agent performing the 
contrastive choice. 
Finally, the findings from a study by Spaepen & Spelke (2007) indicate that 12 month-
olds draw upon generic knowledge of categories of objects in attributing goals to agents. 
Specifically, when an agent had preferentially chosen a red female doll over a blue truck 
during familiarization, and was then faced with the choice between a blue male doll and a red 
truck in the test phase, the infants expected her to have the goal of grasping the doll. This 
reveals a capacity for active selection of contextually relevant semantic information 
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(knowledge-based goal attribution), which is difficult to account for within the constraints 
which B&A’s theory imposes on the minimal mindreading system. 
 Taken as a whole, this body of research supports the view that goal attribution in 
infancy is informed by generic semantic knowledge (knowledge-based goal attribution) and is 
sensitive to the specific causal structure of the situation (situational goal attribution). 
Moreover, infants also draw upon information about agent-specific preferences in attributing 
goals (i.e. making use of agentic linking). As we argued in the previous section, these abilities 
are difficult to explain within the constraints adopted by B&A in their account of the minimal 
mindreading system. Furthermore, the contrastive choice experiments indicate that infant goal 
attribution is sensitive to the epistemic situation of the agent, taking into account both 
perceptual access and beliefs. A primary motivation for B&A’s teleological account of goal 
attribution is to avoid the need to make the representation of goals dependent on other 
psychological states, like desires and beliefs, yet this evidence suggests that infants do treat 
goals, preferences and beliefs as interrelated and mutually influencing. 
 
Problems in Applying Principles 2-4 
 
The problems with principle 1 have consequences for the rest of B&A’s account because 
principles 2-4 depend on appropriate goal attributions. We can illustrate this by considering 
some specific cases. The false belief task devised by Träuble et al. (2010) involves a complex, 
novel situation in which correct belief attribution depends on situationally sensitive goal 
attribution. In this study, Träuble and colleagues showed that infants could correctly ascribe 
true and false beliefs to an agent about the location of a ball when the agent manipulated an 
apparatus without visual access. Specifically, the apparatus was a balance beam with a box at 
each end. When a foam ball was placed in one of the boxes, and that end of the beam was 
raised, the ball would noiselessly roll to the other box. In a true belief condition the agent 
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manipulated the beam herself while facing forward and able to see the transfer of the ball. In a 
false belief condition the agent’s back was turned and the beam was manipulated without her 
input, resulting in the transfer of the ball. In a manipulation condition the agent again faced 
away from the apparatus but manipulated the beam herself, causing the ball to transfer 
between boxes. In each condition two different outcomes were contrasted: either the agent 
reached for the ball in the original box (wrong location) or in the new box into which the ball 
had rolled (correct location). The key result was that 15-month-olds expected the agent to 
reach for the correct location in the true belief and manipulation conditions, but not in the 
false belief condition.  
 One possible interpretation of these results, which is consistent with the findings 
discussed in the previous section, is that the infants attributed to the agent a causal 
understanding of the balance beam and used her manipulation of the beam as a basis for 
ascribing a belief about the location of the ball to her. This interpretation is not compatible 
with B&A’s account: it recognizes physical manipulation as a source of beliefs, and it also 
recognizes interactions between beliefs: the belief about the ball’s location is mediated by a 
belief about how the apparatus operates. B&A offer a different interpretation. They say (2013, 
footnote 12, p. 617) that this case can be covered by the clause in principle 3 which stipulates 
that it can be inferred that the agent has registered the location of an object if that agent has 
successfully performed a goal-directed action involving the object. In other words, infants 
don’t represent physical manipulation as a source of beliefs, or relations between beliefs about 
the apparatus and beliefs about the ball, but they do infer beliefs on the basis of successful 
manipulation. In effect, because the agent performed a successful action which had the ball as 
its target, the agent must somehow have registered the location of the ball. 
 For B&A’s explanation to work, though, the infant must identify the goal of the 
agent’s action as moving the ball to the new box. Notably, the agent doesn’t directly act on 
the ball or interact with the ball at the new location until she reaches into the second box. And 
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in manipulating the beam with her back turned the agent might have had other goals. She 
might have simply wanted to raise the beam, for example. How could an infant employing 
principle 1 specifically pick out moving the ball to the new box as the goal of the action? 
 The action is novel and unusual, so the goal can’t be identified as the procedural 
outcome of an established action type. One possibility is that the infant classifies the action as 
a type during the familiarization phase, where the action was repeatedly demonstrated. In 
these trials, the agent’s gaze did conspicuously follow the movement of the ball, possibly 
marking for the infant the movement of the ball as the goal of lifting the beam. The action 
was only demonstrated four times, however. Implicit learning characteristically occurs 
through lengthy exposure (Eichenbaum, 2003; Squire, 2004). It is thus not clear how B&A 
might explain this result, and the alternative interpretation – that the infants identify the goal 
by attributing to the agent a causal understanding of the apparatus – is strengthened by the 
results described in the previous section, which indicated that infants are sensitive to the 
causal structure of action. 
 The problems with principle 1 also result in difficulties explaining standard change-of-
location false belief tasks. In the conventional scenario, an agent (sometimes called Sally) 
places an object (such as a doll) in a box and then leaves the room. While Sally is gone, 
another agent (Anne) moves the doll to a second box. Sally subsequently returns and 
approaches one of the two boxes. The problem for B&A’s theory is that when Sally re-enters 
the room the infant must ascribe to her not only a belief about where the doll is, but also the 
goal of obtaining the doll. More specifically, the fourth principle says that in initiating an 
action with a goal that specifies a particular object, an agent will act as if the object is at the 
location where she has registered it. This is intended to explain why the infant expects Sally 
to approach the box where she falsely believes the doll to be. But to generate this prediction 
the doll must be specified as the goal of Sally’s action, and there is no clear basis for this 
ascription in the first principle as it is currently formulated. If goal attribution is based on 
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procedural action type, and procedural action type is determined by movement pattern, then 
the infant should simply ascribe to Sally the goal of engaging with whichever box she 
approaches. Nor is there any stereotypical structure in the immediate context as Sally re-
enters the room that links her action to the goal of obtaining the doll, in the way that a running 
water tap can indicate that the reaching aims to turn it off.  
 These considerations don’t show definitively that B&A’s approach cannot work: the 
characterization of the minimal mindreading system can be extended, and it is an open 
question what any such extensions might or might not be able to explain. But the account is 
designed to avoid appeal to flexible explicit-executive cognitive processes and the 
representation of interdependencies amongst psychological states – two key features that 
B&A associate with ‘full-blown’ mindreading. Especially when taken as a whole, the results 
that we’ve surveyed reveal a high degree of flexibility in infant goal attribution. We suggest 
that it will not be easy to develop a parsimonious explanation of these results which does not 
involve explicit-executive cognitive processing.  
This point can be reinforced by considering some additional false belief experiments 
that appear to involve agentic linking and the use of semantic knowledge. A paradigm 
employed by Surian et al. (2007) uses contrastive choice to establish that one of two objects is 
the goal of the agent: the agent sees both an apple and a piece of cheese being placed behind 
screens, and consistently approaches the cheese. Here, infants appear to take into account 
agent preferences in order to determine what the agent’s goal is in the false belief condition. 
Other studies seem to show flexible integration of semantic knowledge. For example4, Scott 
et al. (2010) presented 18-month-olds with a task in which one agent watched while a second 
agent demonstrated that a target object rattled when shaken. In the test phase, the first agent 
had the opportunity to choose between two objects to produce the rattling sound. One of the 
objects was similar in appearance to the target object while the other was dissimilar. The 
                                                
4 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out the relevance of this study. 
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infants expected the second agent to select the object that was similar, even though they knew 
that in fact it was the dissimilar object that rattled. This suggests that the infants were 
employing semantic knowledge to form the expectation that the agent would use similar 
appearance to the model object as a guide to which test object would rattle.  
 
Two Kinds of Response to These Problems 
 
To review, the basic problem is that principle 1 of B&A’s minimal mindreading system does 
not provide a positive account of goal attribution. Principles 2-4 depend on the attribution of 
specific goals, and without a positive account of goal attribution the theory fails to account for 
infant expectations in the false belief tasks it is intended to explain. In section 3 we argued 
that the overarching assumptions that B&A have adopted require that goal attribution by the 
minimal mindreading system not include flexible, controlled knowledge-based processes. 
This, in turn, rules out situational goal attribution and severely limits the potential to make use 
of agentic linking to inform goal attribution. The contrastive choice experiments reviewed in 
section 4 provide a substantial body of evidence indicating that infants do indeed make use of 
agentic linking and situational goal attribution. And in section 5 we argued that procedural 
goal attribution will struggle to explain goal attribution in the balance beam task and standard 
change-of-location false belief tasks.  
 There are two main ways that B&A might respond to these difficulties. The first is to 
elaborate the first principle along the same lines as the second, third and fourth principles. 
That is, B&A might postulate a specialized representational system for goal attribution. This 
would need to explain how goal attribution works for novel actions based on initial 
acquaintance or limited exposure, and explain the tracking of goals across extended action 
sequences. For example, it might be specified that, on the first performance of a novel action, 
goal identification is based on movement patterns and/or eye gaze. On subsequent occasions 
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the same goal will be ascribed unless there are cues indicating that the context is different, in 
which case there will be no goal attribution. In certain conditions, action directed at an object 
will be taken to establish an enduring preference for the object which influences subsequent 
actions.  
The threat facing this approach is that specifying in detail the conditions in which 
goals are and are not attributed will require a complex and ad hoc set of representations and 
representational relations. Appropriately tracking goals across multiple actions and through 
mediated causal relations in particular presents a difficult challenge. As we have seen, infant 
goal attribution appears to be sensitive to causal relations – infants attribute a goal to an action 
when the causal relation to the outcome is intact, and do not attribute the goal to the action 
when the causal relation is broken. But by assumption the minimal mindreading system lacks 
the flexibility and control required for integrated situation awareness, and it consequently 
does not have access to causal information concerning action-outcome relations. To capture 
this sensitivity, the goal attribution system would require proxy cues that correspond to intact 
and broken causal relations. But since such relations can be extremely diverse, it is hard to see 
what such cues might be. For this reason we doubt that this approach can succeed. 
 The second type of response that B&A might adopt is to abandon the idea that infant 
mindreading is strongly encapsulated. Instead, mindreading might involve an interplay in 
which a variety of specialized systems are integrated via executive cognition. Thus, 
specialized systems for causal representation, agent tracking, the representation of agent’s 
attitudes, and action structure might all take input from and contribute to generalized situation 
awareness. The overall integration of information might depend not on ‘hard coded’ 
principles but on flexible cognitive inferences facilitated by learning. This approach would 
constitute a fundamental change in orientation, however. It would require abandoning the idea 
that the disparity between infant false belief performance using implicit and explicit measures 
is because the former depends on a separate mindreading system that distinctively does not 
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employ flexible, explicit cognitive processes. It would also require reconsideration of the core 
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